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The Jury's Role Under the Indiana Constitution
The distribution of power between the judge and jury in criminal cases
has been a concern of Indiana courts since 1851 when article I, section 19 of
the Indiana Constitution was adopted. It provides: "In all criminal cases the
jury has the right to determine the law as well as the facts." It has been over
a century since this constitutional mandate was formulated, yet the line which
separates the provinces of the judge and jury remains a shifting and uncertain
boundary.1 Indiana courts profess to have preserved the prerogative of the
jury to determine the law, and in certain respects, it is true that their deci-
sions have performed this function.2 However, in the main the task of affir-
matively implementing this unique provision has not been directly addressed.
There has been no definitive explanation of just what it is that a jury
should do when it "determines law." Further, only minimal attention has
been directed toward the role counsel can play in this constitutional scheme.
Avoidance of these issues by the appellate courts of Indiana only detracts
from the effectiveness of trial judges, juries and counsel. The courts have
more than a passive obligation in the face of a constitutional provision of this
nature. They are obliged to speak out on the issues raised and to implement
those mandates which come within the power of judicial administration.
3
Therefore, this note briefly traces the development of article I, section 19,
identifies those areas of particular difficulty which 'the courts have en-
countered and suggests a model which the courts should adopt to aid in the
affirmative implementation of this constitutional provision. In the latter task,
this note places particular emphasis upon the implications this implementa-
tion would have on the role counsel can play in guiding a jury to a proper
determination of the law.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY AS DETERMINER OF LAW
At one time the practice of jury determination of the law in criminal
cases was widespread in the United States.4 During the nineteenth century the
institution of the jury achieved this elevated status by way of constitutional
provision, statute and judicial practiceA Toward the end of the century,
however, the practice declined as the judges sought to gain control of the
'See Beavers v. State, 236 Ind. 549, 564, 141 N.E.2d 118, 125 (1957).
2See, e.g., Pritchard v. State, 248 Ind. 566, 230 N.E.2d 416 (1967); Parker v. State, 243
Ind. 482, 185 N.E.2d 727 (1962); Dedrick v. State, 210 Ind. 259, 2 N.E.2d 409 (1936).
3See IND. CODE §§ 34-5-1-2, 34-5-2-1 (1976); INDIANA RULE OF PROCEDURE 1 (1973).
'See HoweJuries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939); Recent Cases.
11 MINN. L. REV. 472 (1926).
5See HoweJuries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939).
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jury.6 Presently, Indiana and Maryland are the only states where a provision
mandating this jury function is still given effect. 7
The Indiana jury has not always had the right to determine the law in
criminal cases. Article I, section 10 of the Indiana Constitution of 18168
specifically limited the jury's authority to determine the law to cases involving
libel.9 This restriction on the jury's power was consistent with the common
law tradition brought to this country from England.10
'See Sparf v. United States, 156U.S. 51 (1895); L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 378-80 (1930);
Howe,Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939); Scheflin,Jury Nullifica-
tion: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168, 170 (1972); Note, The Changing Role of the
Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170 (1964).
5Howe,Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582, 614 (1939). Article XV,
section 5 of the Maryland Constitution of 1867 (amended 1950), provides: "In the trial of all
criminal cases, the jury shall be the judges of the law, as well as the fact, except that the Court
may pass on the sufficiency of the evidence." The Georgia courts have reduced that state's provi-
sion, GA. CONST. 2-201, to a mere formality by binding the jury to follow the court's instruc-
tions. See Jones v. State, 235 Ga. 103, 218 S.E.2d 899 (1975); Brown v. State, 40 Ga: 689 (1870).
$In prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the official conduct of of-
ficers or men in a public capacity, or where the matter published is proper for the
public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and in all indictments
for libels, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the
direction of the court, as in other cases.
IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 10 (superseded in 1851).
'Townsend v. State, 2 Blackf. 151 (Ind. 1828).
"The roots and development of this jury role have been thoroughly scrutinized by legal
scholars. See, e.g., Howe,juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939). For
further discussion of the English origins of the practice and its expansive adaptation in America,
see Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) (Gray, J. dissenting); United States v. Dougherty,
473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Wylie v. Warden, 372 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967); Beavers v.
State, 236 Ind. 549, 141 N.E.2d 118 (1957); Williams v. State, 10 Ind. 503, 514-25 (1858) (brief
for the appellant); P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 3-14 (3d ed. 1966); R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE
COMMON LAW 122-23 (1921). Arnold, Law and Fact in the Medieval Jury Trial: Out of Sight,
Out of Mind, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 267 (1974); Kadish & Kadish, OnJustified Rule Departures
by Officials, 59 CAL. L. REv. 905, 914 (1971); Sax, Conscience and Anarchy: The Prosecution of
War Resisters, 57 YALE REV. 481, 483-86 (1968).
Those who have supported a powerful jury role have viewed the jury as a protection against
arbitrary law enforcement and a more reliable safeguard of individual rights. Further, it has
been argued that the jury provides a link between community values or community conscience
and the legal system. Other important advantages attributed to the jury include common sense
and freshness. These qualities operate as a desirable counterweight to the more technical and
sometimes rigid approach of the judge. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 373 (1972) (opi-
nion of Powell, J.); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (discussion of the justifications
for the institution of the jury in general); Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 174 (1895) (Gray,
J., dissenting); Pritchard v. State, 248 Ind. 566, 576, 230 N.E.2d 416, 421 (1967); Christie,
Lawful Departures from Legal Rules: 'Jury Nullification" and Legitimated Disobedience, 62
CAL. L. REv. 1289, 1296 (1974); Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12
(1910); Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration ofJustice, 40 AM.
L. REV. 729, 731 (1906); Van Dyke, The Jury as a Political Institution, CENTER MAG., March-
April, 1970, at 17; Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.
J. 170, 172 (1964).
Opposition to expanded jury power has focused on certain institutional characteristics and
jury competence. One criticism has been the jury's lack of training and competence to deal with
the complexities of law in a modern industrial and largely urban society. Another concern has
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Indiana case law struggled from the beginning to define the limits of the
jury's role as a determiner of law. In Townsend v. State, 11 the Indiana
Supreme Court emphatically rejected the contention that the jury's right to
determine the law under the 1816 constitution extended beyond libel cases.1 2
The court indicated that such a contention was a "misapprehension of the
province of the jury as to questions of law" which arose out of the jury's
authority to find a general verdict."3 Recognizing that in the process of
rendering a general verdict involving both law and fact the jury might never-
theless decide the law differently from what the judge thought it to be, the
court stated: "This they can do, but it is classed by all writers on the subject
among their powers of doing wrong. It is a violation of their oaths, and surely
the question is not, how illegally a jury may act, but what is their proper
sphere of action. 1' 4 The issue was again raised in Warren v. State, 15 a case in
which the defendant had requested the trial court to instruct the jury that
they were the judges of the law as well as the facts.16 In a very terse opinion,
been the lack of continuity and accountability, resulting from the fact that the jury sits only once
as a group, which in turn may lead to uncertainty and instability in the law. Further, critics have
feared that jurors may be biased and ruled by their feelings. Others have been concerned that
the jury, in exercising its right to determine the law, might usurp the legislature's role by either
ignoring or changing statutory enactments and might entrench on the authority of the appellate
courts by interpreting the law contrary to precedent. There has also been fear that unwarranted
acquittals will result from a lack of responsibility on the part of the jury. See Sparf v. United
States, 156 U.S. 51, 71 (1895); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1134 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Beavers v. State, 236 Ind. 549, 564, 141 N.E.2d 118, 124 (1957); Fowler v. State, 85 Ind.
538, 541-42 (1882) (Elliott, J., dissenting); Townsend v. State, 2 Blackf. 151, 185 (Ind. 1828); R.
POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 125-24 (1921); Fortas, Follow-up/The Jury, CENTER
MAG., July-Aug., 1970, at 59, 61; Howe,Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REv.
582, 591 (1939); Kadish & Kadish, OnJustified Rule Departures by Officials, 59 CAL. L. Rv.
905, 915 (1971); Roberts, Follow-up/TheJury, CENTER MAG., July-Aug., 1972, at 59, 62; Van
Dyke, The Jury as a Political Institution, CENTaER MAG., March-April, 1970, at 17, 21; Note, The
Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 172 (1964).
The jury's critics ultimately prevailed in most jurisdictions. As the tide of legal sentiment
turned against the jury at the end of the nineteenth century, judges asserted increasing control
over the jury. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895); Howe,Juries asJudges of Criminal
Law, 52 HARV. L. Rav. 582 (1939); Note, The Changing Role of theJury in the Nineteenth Century,
74 YALE L.J. 170 (1964). It is not clear why Indiana did not follow that trend. There have been
occasional demands for change by constitutional amendment, but little has come of them. See
Robinson, Proposals for the Improvement of the Administration of Criminal Justice in Indiana, 2
IND. L.J. 217, 223-24 (1926); Note, Criminal Law-Indiana Juries in Criminal Cases asJudges of
Law under Constitutional Relic, 24 NOTRE DAME LAW. 365, 372 (1949). The Indiana provision
has never been challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution. However, the comparable Maryland provision has withstood such a
challenge on several occasions. See Wylie v. Warden, 372 F.2d 742, 747 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 867 (1967); Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370, 183 A.2d 359, cert. denied, 372 U.S. 767
(1963).
"2 Blackf. 151 (Ind. 1828).
"The court indicated that the adoption of this provision in the, constitution was an expres-
sion of the framers' opinion that "no such general right existed; and the adoption of it in cases of
libels only is conclusive that they did not intend to extend it to any other cases." Id. at 157.
1Id. at 159.
14Id.




without reference to Townsend, the supreme court here held the trial court's
refusal to give the requested instruction to be erroneous.
1 7
Despite the uncertainty created by the Warren case, the supreme court
apparently did not take up the issue again until 1851, the year in which the
provision was amended. The 1851 amendment eliminated the libel limitation
resulting in the current version of article I, section 19.18 There was little
discussion concerning the elimination of the libel limitation, but the clear im-
plication was that the scope of the jury's power had been broadened con-
siderably.' 9 Nevertheless the supreme court's decision in Carter v. State,
20
decided later that same year, did not reflect this expansion; instead, it essen-
tially reaffirmed the position of the Townsend court. In Carter the court
upheld an instruction that although the jury was the judge of the law and the
facts, it was the jurors' duty to "believe the law to be as laid down by the
court." 21 Despite one subsequent case softening this admonition to the jury,
22
the court continued to adhere to the limit on the jury's sphere of action as
first set by the Townsend court and reaffirmed by Carter. 23
Lynch v. State, 24 decided in 1857, marked a turning point. The trial
court in Lynch had refused to permit counsel to argue a question of law to
the jury on the ground that determination of the law was within the province
of the judge. The question of law involved was not a statutory one but rather
a constitutional question.25 In upholding the right of counsel to argue, and
hence the right of the jury to determine questions of law arising both from
statutes and the constitution, the supreme court said:
Taking the constitution and the statute together, it would seem that the
Court instructs juries in criminal cases, not to bind their consciences, but to
inform their judgments; and while great deference would naturally be paid
171d.
8See, Robinson, Proposals for the Improvement of the Administration of Criminal Justice
in Indiana, 2 IND. L.J. 217, 223 (1926).
"5Note, Criminal Law-Indiana Juries in Criminal Cases as Judges of Law under Constitu-
tional Relic, 24 NOTRE DAME LAW. 365, 367 (1949). See also Williams v. State, 10 Ind. 503
(1858) (recognizing the broadening of the provision).
The expansion of the jury's role was carried to its outer limit by the cases which held that
under the 1851 constitution juries in criminal cases "are the exclusive judges of the law and
facts." McCarthy v. State, 56 Ind. 203, 205 (1877). Since the actual constitutional provision says
nothing about exclusivity, this characteristic was added purely by judicial gloss. This judicially
derived exclusivity has caused a great deal of consternation in the courts, and has perhaps been
one of the major obstacles to the implementation of the provision. See, e.g., Beavers v. State,
236 Ind. 549, 141 N.E.2d 118 (1957); Bridgewater v. State, 153 Ind. 560, 55 N.E. 737 (1899);
Fowler v. State, 85 Ind. 538 (1882).
202 Ind. 617 (1851).
21Id. at 619.
22Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 326 (1855).
"'See Driskill v. State, 7 Ind. 338 (1855). This line of early cases expressed the views which
eventually prevailed in other jurisdictions and among legal scholars. See HoweJuries asJudges of
Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939).




by the jury to the opinion of the judge, or judges, still it cannot be said that
they are in duty bound to adopt it as their own.
26
One year later the Indiana Supreme Court completed the break from
common law tradition which it had begun in Lynch. In Williams v. State
27
the court expressly rejected the jury instruction which it had upheld seven
years before in Carter v. State28 and refused to bind the jury in a criminal
case to the law as announced by the judges.2 9 Thus, the foundation for the
jury's role as determiner of the criminal law was finally judicially validated.
Subsequent judicial interpretation of article I, section 19 has limited the
scope of the jury's powers by removing certain aspects of the trial from the
jury's reach,3 0 areas which technically involve questions of law but which are
not directly related to traditional jury deliberations. Unfortunately, a number
of practical problems arising from attempts to implement article I, section 19
remain unanswered. Foremost among these is the question of what powers the
jury possesses when determining the law: nullifying the existing law, making
new law or construing the law? In attempting to define "the right to deter-
mine the law," the Indiana Supreme Court has firmly established that the
jury cannot set aside existing law, nor can it make new law of its own.31 On
the other hand, the admonition that the jury should administer the law as
they find it has not been taken to mean that the jury must take the law as
given by the court. 32 The courts have consistently indicated that the jury may
21d. at 542.
710 Ind. 503 (1858).
82 Ind. 617 (1851). See also, Driskill v. State, 7 Ind. 338 (1855).
t"See Williams v. State, 10 Ind. 503, 504 (1858).
"°Beavers v. State, 236 Ind. 549, 557, 141 N.E.2d 118, 125 (1957) (judge determines the
law in all procedural matters); Anderson v. State, 104 Ind. 467, 477, 5 N.E. 711, 712 (1885)
(court judges the sufficiency of the indictment, decides all questions of admissibility of evidence,
has the power to grant a new trial). But see Hudelson v. State, 94 Ind. 426 (1883) (jury does
have the right to say that the facts proven do not constitute a public offense even if they are the
same as those given in the indictment).
-"See, e.g., Beavers v. State, 236 Ind. 549, 141 N.E.2d 118 (1957); Burris v. State, 218
Ind. 601, 34 N.E.2d 928 (1941) (jurors cannot ignore the law); Cunacoff v. State, 193 Ind. 62,
138 N.E. 690 (1923); Trainer v. State, 198 Ind. 502, 154 N.E. 273 (1926); LeSueur v. State, 176
Ind. 448, 95 N.E. 239 (1911); Bridgewater v. State, 153 Ind. 560, 55 N.E. 737 (1899); Anderson
v. State, 104 Ind. 467, 5 N.E. 711 (1885). One reason for this position is the separation of
powers doctrine. In upholding the instruction challenged in Cunacoff v. State, 193 Ind, 62, 138
N.E. 690 (1923), the court articulated a recurrent theme:
The complaint about this instruction is that it tells the jurors to administer the law as
they actually find it to be, regardless of whether or not they think the law is what it
should be. This admonition is not only good for jurors, but also for courts and all per-
sons who have to do with the administration of laws, as well as for citizens who should
obey the laws. Laws are made to be applied and enforced, and no one has a right to
set aside that which is, and to substitute what he thinks it should be, except the law-
making body elected for that purpose.
Id. at 63, 138 N.E. at 690-91. See also Denson v. State, - Ind. - , 330 N.E.2d 734, 737
(1975); Beavers v. State, 236 Ind. 549, 562-63, 141 N.E.2d 118, 124 (1957); Fowler v. State, 85
Ind. 538, 542 (1882).
"See Beavers v. State, 236 Ind. 549, 564-65, 141 N.E.2d 118, 124-125 (1957); Bryant v.
State, 205 Ind. 372, 380, 186 N.E. 322, 325 (1933); Trainer v. State, 198 Ind. 502, 508, 154
1977]
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construe the law for itself.3 3 Although the supreme court has said that the
jury has the right to "say that the facts in evidence do not constitute a 'public
offense,' although those facts may be the same as the facts stated in the in-
dictment, ' 34 the judiciary has avoided a direct approach to the process to be
followed by the jury, choosing instead to direct its attention toward more
peripheral issues. For example, courts have emphasized the need to impress
the jury with its sober responsibility.3 6 The courts have also tried to direct the
jury's attention to sources of law which warrant their serious consideration.3 6
Despite the indirect attempts to give meaning to the jury's function, ap-
parently irreconcilable problems have arisen. A case in point concerns the
weight to be given to prior supreme court decisions. The Indiana Supreme
Court recognized a conflict as early as 1882 in Keiser v. State37:
The Supreme Court, to be sure, is the ultimate tribunal for the determina-
tion of questions of law arising under the constitution and the laws of the
State, whose decisions are binding on the inferior courts, and entitled to the
highest respect from juries in criminal causes. But if such juries, conscien-
tiously believing the law to be otherwise, may not follow their convictions,
but are bound as an absolute duty, to be governed by the decisions of the
Supreme Court, then the constitutional provision is a dead letter.
38
Seventy-five years later the Indiana Supreme Court was still struggling
with this same problem, as illustrated by the case of Beavers v. State.3 9
Beavers represented an acknowledgment of the continuing conflict between
the authority of the court and the powers of the jury. Unfortunately, the ap-
proach taken was a negative one which merely paraded the horrors of poten-
tial jury capriciousness and lamented the existence of the "archaic" provision.
Aside from a restatement of the provision's development to date, no new or
constructive analysis was undertaken:
N.E. 273, 275 (1926); Le Sueur v. State, 176 Ind. 448, 456, 95 N.E. 239, 241 (1911); Anderson
v. State, 104 Ind. 467, 478, 5 N.E. 711, 712 (1885).
"See Sankey v. State, 157 Ind.App. 627, 301 N.E.2d 235 (1973). The instruction given in
Sankey stated: "[T]his provision confers upon you the right to determine and construe the law for
yourselves, although your determination may differ from that stated by the court in these instruc-
tions ...." Id. at 634, 301 N.E.2d at 239. See also Hengstler v. State, 207 Ind. 28, 189 N.E.
623 (1934); Bryant v. State, 205 Ind. 372, 186 N.E. 322 (1933).
14Hudelson v. State, 94 Ind. 426, 430 (1883). See also, Pritchard v. State, 248 Ind. 566,
230 N.E.2d 416 (1967).
3'See, e.g., Minton v. State, 247 Ind. 307, 214 N.E.2d 380 (1966); Sankey v. State, 157
Ind.App. 627, 635, 301 N.E.2d 235, 244 (1973).
"6The judge is required by statute to state to the jury "all matters of law which are
necessary for their information in giving their verdict. ... IND. CODE § 35-1-35-1 (1976).
However, the jury may also look to statutes, the constitution, the common law, prior decisions in
Indiana and elsewhere, and argument of counsel. See Hubbard v. State, 262 Ind. 176, 182, 313
N.E.2d 346, 350 (1974); Hengstler v. State, 207 Ind. 28, 34-35, 189 N.E. 623, (1934); Bryant v.
State, 205 Ind. 372, 379-80, 186 N.E. 322, 325 (1933); Trainer v. State, 198 Ind. 502, 507. 154
N.E. 273, 275 (1926); LeSueur v. State, 176 Ind. 448, 95 N.E. 239 (1911); Lynch v. State, 9
Ind. 541, 541-42 (1857).
3183 Ind. 234 (1882).
"I1d. at 236.
31236 Ind. 549, 141 N.E.2d 118 (1957).
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A jury may not cast aside such advice or instructions lightly, and should be
so instructed in view of their general lack of such knowledge. A consciousness
of their responsibility, oath and duty in that respect is an aid to the proper
performance of their constitutional duty. Nevertheless upon final analysis
after being so informed and cautioned the jury has the power to go its own
way, and determine the law for itself when it renders a verdict. If the defen-
dant is found guilty its determination of the law, if in error, will be overrid-
den by the court's better understanding of the law in the interest of justice
and constitutional law.4
0
The most recent comprehensive statement concerning article I, section 19
came almost ten years ago, and surprisingly, it was a rejection of the reserva-
tions that had been expressed in Beavers. In Pritchard v. State41 the supreme
court apparently felt the need to dispel any notion generated by the Beavers
opinion that a trial court could now give binding instructions. 42 While
Beavers was cited for the proposition that the trial court was not obligated to
instruct the jury that it could disregard the law 43 the thrust of the Pritchard
opinion was a reaffirmation of article I, section 19:
It appears to this Court, that Art. I, § 19 taken in connection with the
presumption of innocence is far from an outmoded, archaic anachronism.
Rather despite its venerable age, it appears to be in the vanguard of modem
thinking with regard to the full protection of the rights of the criminal defen-
dant.
4 4
In cases such as Keiser, Beavers and Pritchard, the court discusses "the
law" or former supreme court decisions as if there is uniformity in their clari-
ty and definiteness. 45 Yet in other cases, the reviewing court has upheld the
action of the trial judge because the law was too clearly established to permit
the jury to come to any other conclusion 8 or has overturned a conviction by
40Id. at 564-65, 141 N.E.2d at 125.
41248 Ind. 566, 230 N.E.2d 416 (1967).
42The discussion was prompted by a reference made in 1 EWBANtS IND. CRIMINAL LAW §
416 (Symmes ed. 1965-66 Supp.) that Beavers v. State, 236 Ind. 549, 141 N.E.2d 118 (1957),
supported mandatory instructions. The Pritchard court stated that Beavers "does not support the
right of a trial court to give a specific mandatory instruction on the facts and the law in a case."
248 Ind. at 571, 230 N.E.2d at 419. The court went on to say that despite the fact that the In-
diana provision has been called an outmoded relic, it is still the constitutional rule in this state.
Id. at 571, 230 N.E.2d at 421.
43248 Ind. 566, 572-73, 230 N.E.2d 416, 419-20 (1967). The Pritchard court also read
Beavers as reaffirming Anderson v. State, 104 Ind. 467, 4 N.E. 63 (1886). Id. at 573, 230
N.E.2d at 420.
"Pritchard v. State, 248 Ind. 566, 576, 230 N.E.2d 416, 421 (1967).
45This tendency is not unique to Indiana courts. One legal scholar has remarked: "[Fjor
understandable reasons, practicing lawyers, judges, scholars and users of the law characterize it
in terms that are more precise than its underlying materials-the constitution, statutes and
cases." Christie, Lawful Departures from Legal Rules: 'Jury Nullification" and Legitimated
Disobedience, 62 CAL. L. Rav. 1289, 1292 (1974).
4See Powell v. State, - Ind.App. - , 312 N.E.2d 521, 522-23 (1974) (instruction in
a burglary trial that "the use of the slightest force in pushing aside a door in order to enter con-
stitutes a breaking" upheld). Cf Cole v. State, 192 Ind. 29, 134 N.E. 867 (1922). In holding that
1977]
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the jury because the law was clearly not what the jurors took it to be, 47
thereby implying that the jury's role may depend on ambiguity in the law.
This is, therefore, an important contradiction in the cases; a contradiction
which the courts have neither recognized nor reconciled. This contradiction
also illustrates the fact that the courts have failed to take a direct approach
to determining what it means for the jury to construe the law. The piecemeal
case-by-case approach has been inadequate, leading to contradictions rather
than a coherent, unified pattern. Indiana courts need to create a model for
the jury's role under article I, section 19, and then to faithfully implement it
in practice. This creative role is a part of the supreme court's responsibility of
interpreting the constitution and administering the judicial system through
the development of rules48 as well as doctrine. Only by establishing such a
"roadmap" can the supreme court provide truly effective guidance for those
directly affected by article I, section 19: trial counsel, judge and jury.
THE ROLE OF THE JURY: A MODEL
The nature of the jury's power to construe the law must be established
before any other questions can be addressed. The cases have heretofore
established only shadowy contours of what is entailed when the jury deter-
mines the law. The constitutional provision itself4" contains neither words of
exclusivity nor limitation. Despite early decisions on the "exclusive" aspect of
the jury's law-determining function,50 the case law reveals limitations on the
scope of the jury's role. To begin with, the words of an applicable statute are
controlling, at least to the extent that they are unambiguous.5' If the jury is
the trial court was not required to instruct on manslaughter in a felony-imsurder trial, the court
stated that it is "committed to the doctrine that where felonious intent to commit robbery and a
killing in the perpetration of that crime are shown, it is not necessary to show an intent to kill in
order to prove the accused guilty of murder in the first degree." Id. at 37, 134 N.E. at 870.41See Holloway v. State, - Ind.App. - , 352 N.E.2d 523 (1976) (conviction of the
lesser offense of aggravated assault and battery reversed because the offense required the inflic-
tion of serious bodily harm, and the harm shown by the prosecution could not possibly rise to
that level).48See IND. CODE § 34-5-1-2, § 34-5-2-1 (1976).
49"In all criminal cases, the jury has the right to determine the law as well as the facts."
IND. CONST. art. I, § 19.
50See, e.g., McCarthy v. State, 56 Ind. 203 (1877). The courts implying this exclusivity may
have arrived at their interpretations because of the role of the jury as the exclusive judges on
questions of fact. They may have taken for granted that the jury would likewise be the "exclusive
judges of the law." There is no evidence in the cases that the courts consciously considered
whether it was actually appropriate or necessary to treat these two functions as being exactly
parallel. In the context of considering how the jury should treat the judge's instructions, the
supreme court recognized that there were different factors involved in the factfinding role than in
the law-determining function. Compare Landreth v. State, 201 Ind. 691, 698-99, 171 N.E. 192,
195 (1930) with Blaker v. State, 130 Ind. 203, 29 N.E. 1077 (1891) and Anderson v. State, 104
Ind. 467, 5 N.E. 711 (1885).
51See Holloway v. State, - Ind.App. - , 352 N.E.2d 523, 529 (1976) (aggravated
assault and battery clearly requires the infliction of serious bodily harm). However, the court has
apparently not incorporated this limitation on the controlling words in instructions it has ap-
proved or recommended. See Holliday v. State, 254 Ind. 85, 257 N.E.2d 679 (1970).
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not empowered to nullify the law or make new law, as the cases have clearly
established,52 this limitation naturally follows. A further amplification of the
provision, inferred from the courts' traditional focus on the sources of law
available to the jury, is that the jury is expected, in fact urged, to do more
than rely on its own ideas and experiences.53 From the components of
counsel's argument approved in Bryant v. State, 54 the elements to be con-
sidered by the jury include relevant statutes, the common law, the decisions
of the appellate courts, the instructions of the trial judge and the argument
of counsel. These limitations still leave many aspects of the process of deter-
mining the law unclear and do not prescribe a coherent role or model for the
jury in its law-determining function. The cases, for example, have failed to
deal with the fact that not all law is statutory and not all statutory language
is unambiguous. Furthermore, the court has not addressed the issue of how
the jury should approach a question of first impression. With the recent revi-
sion of the Indiana Penal Code 55 providing the judicial system a unique op-
portunity to deal with this problem on a massive scale, 56 it is all the more
urgent that courts deal with the foregoing questions, particularly the jury's
treatment of issues of first impression.
The Jury in the Judge's Shoes
To incorporate what positive implementation it has effected and to
reconcile or eliminate the contradictions and inconsistencies which have ap-
peared in the case law, the supreme court should provide that the jury steps
into the trial judge's shoes, so to speak, and then should develop an opera-
tional model on this basis with modifications to accommodate the jury's col-
legial nature. In most jurisdictions, including civil cases in Indiana, the
judge's function generally is to determine the applicable law regarding the
merits of the case. In a criminal case, the starting point is the statute under
5See note 31 supra & text accompanying. To say that the words are not controlling would
be to intrude impermissibly upon the power of the legislature to define what constitutes a crime
in the state. See Beavers v. State, 236 Ind. 549, 562, 141 N.E.2d 118, 124 (1957) (dictum)
(recognition must be given to the constitutional power of the legislative branch); Trainer v. State,
198 Ind. 502, 508, 154 N.E. 273, 275 (1926) (dictum) (determination of law by the jury is not the
right to make law); Cunacoff v. State, 193 Ind. 62, 138 N.E. 69 (1923) (dictum) (only the
legislature has the right to set aside that law which is and substitute what should be).
"See, e.g., Beavers v. State, 236 Ind. 549, 562, 141 N.E.2d 118, 123 (1957); Trainer v.
State, 198 Ind. 502, 507-08, 154 N.E. 273, 275 (1926); Anderson v. State, 104 Ind. 467, 476, 5
N.E. 711, 712 (1885).
51205 Ind. 372, 380, 186 N.E. 322, 325 (1933) (in final argument, counsel discussed "the
constitutionality of the liquor laws, the seriousness of the penalty in the event of a conviction,
and the evil sought to be reached by the legislature"). See Bowen v. State, 189 Ind. 644, 652,
128 N.E. 926, 929 (1920) (stating that the law of Indiana is not all found in the statutes, and for
a complete definition of embezzlement, one must turn to the common law history).
511976 Ind. Acts, P.L. 148.
5
The new Indiana Penal Code, 1976 Ind. Acts, P.L. 148, repealed or amended 154
statutes or parts of statutes.
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which the indictment or charge is brought. The trial judge, in such a case,
must go through the process of statutory interpretation, guided by canons of
construction, legislative intent and history, and prior decisions. How much
latitude he has depends on how clear or ambiguous the statute is5 7 and on
how well settled its meaning has become under prior decisions of the ap-
pellate courts.5 In this aspect of determining the applicable law the jury
should step into the judge's shoes. This model would be consistent with both
the historical background and the words of the constitutional provision.
Moreover, this model would force the courts to take a new look at the old
question of whether any prior supreme court decisions are binding on the
jury. As indicated earlier, the court has traditionally held that these decisions
are due great respect but are not binding.5 9 Yet the case law indicates that
sometimes an interpretation is too well settled to be open to a different inter-
pretation by the jury.6 0 The court should openly redraw its position on non-
binding precedents. When past adjudication has firmly and unequivocally
established the meaning of a word, phrase or statute, to permit jury reinter-
pretation in every case contravenes the goals of stability and predictability in
the law and nullifies the deterrent effect of statutory prohibition.6 1 Using the
model of the jury in the judge's shoes would provide a useful tool for the trial
court in drawing the line for binding the jury as well as guiding the jury in
exercising its prerogative. The focus then, whether for judge or jury, should
be on the ambiguity of the pertinent law. Such an approach still allows a
great deal of freedom for the jury to exercise its right to determine the law
because it leaves within the jury's ambit any issue arising from statutory am-
biguity, unsettled case law or matters of first impression.
This model would also provide a much needed framework for implemen-
tation of article I, section 19 in other ways. The jury's attention could
routinely be directed to legislative intent.6 2 The jurors could also be in-
"B. CARDOZO. THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 14 (1921).
"
5
See Wyzanski, A TrialJudge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1298
(1952). See also B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 18-20 (1921). Of course, no
law is applicable if it bears no relation to the evidence to be submitted. See La Duron v. State,
157 Ind.App. 189, 194, 299 N.E.2d 227, 229 (1973).
59
Trainer v. State, 198 Ind. 502, 507-08, 154 N.E. 273, 275 (1926). See also Hengstler v.
State, 207 Ind. 28, 35, 189 N.E. 623, 626 (1934).
"See Smith v. State, 258 Ind. 594, 603-04, 283 N.E.2d 365, 370-71 (1972) (instruction
that motive is no defense was upheld); Powell v. State, - Ind.App. - , 312 N.E.2d 521,
522-23 (1974) (instruction on what constitutes a breaking in burglary). The court in Smith v.
State appeared to consider the general law prevailing and found the instruction given to be
valid, thus leaving no room for jury determination. 258 Ind. at 603-04, 283 N.E.2d at 370-71.
See also Cole v. State, 192 Ind. 29, 37-38, 134 N.E. 867, 870 (1922) (holding it is not necessary
to show intent where charge is felony-manslaughter, and jury would be incorrect in determining
otherwise).
IIB. CARDOZO. THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 34 (1921).
"
2
This was included as an appropriate consideration in Bryant v. State, 205 Ind. 372, 380,
186 N.E. 322. 325 (1933), but courts generally have not focused on this factor beyond the con-
cern that may be inferred from the instructions approved in Beavers v. State, 236 Ind. 549, 554,
141 N.E.2d 118, 120-21 (1957), and frequently followed by the trial courts. See, e.g., Holliday v.
State. 254 Ind. 85, 89-90, 257 N.E.2d 679, 682 (1970).
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structed to apply canons of construction.6 3 Based on common-sense, such
rules of interpretation would provide useful guidance to the jury, which until
now has been forced to operate in a vacuum. The suggested model would
also provide a useful analogy in impressing the jurors with the seriousness and
responsibility of their role.
Some aspects of the judge's role, of course, are not applicable and are
not to be delegated to the jury. The jurors make no written report on their
findings of law or fact. They are not held accountable for an incorrect deci-
sion and are not recalled for retrial. Their reasons for acquittal are beyond
review. 64 There are also other issues which might be more appropriately dealt
with separately from the analogy to the judge. One example is how to deal with a
jury which is divided on the question of the defendant's guilt because it is divided
on its determination of the law. 65 A judge may have difficulty deciding and may
be ambivalent as to the correctness of his decision, but he must decide. He may,
however, indicate his reservations in his opinion, which is reviewable. 66 The
jury, on the other hand, cannot resolve reservations in the same manner.
When jurors disagree on the law, there are options available: (1) to "hang";
(2) to resolve reasonable doubt in favor of the defendant following the rule of
strict construction against the state; 67 or (3) to defer to the version of the law
given by the judge. An intermediate solution might be to instruct the jury to
request additional instructions from the court or ask for clarification from the
court on specific points of disagreement6 s in an effort to reach a consensus. A
reasonable overall solution might be to give the jury the opportunity to re-
quest a clarification and then to allow a hung jury if they cannot reach
unanimity on the verdict.
In affirmatively implementing article I, section 19 those qualities that the
jury has to offer in the law-determining process should be identified. Aside
6 Examples of such canons routinely applied by judges are the rule of strict construction,
see, e.g., Utley v. State, 258 Ind. 443, 446, 281 N.E.2d 888, 890 (1972); the canon of ejusdem
generis, see, e.g., Short v. State, 234 Ind. 17, 22, 122 N.E.2d 82, 85 (1954); the rule giving
statutory language its plain, common meaning; and the rule that words of a statute should be in-
terpreted so as to give them, and the siatute, some meaning. See 26 I.L.E. Statutes §§ 101-137
(West 1960).
"Even on acquittal, a judge trying a case without a jury is subject to some review. See IND.
CODE § 35-1-43-2 (1976) (prosecuting attorney may except to any decision of the trial court and
reserve the point of law for the supreme court); IND. CODE § 35-1-47-2 (1976) (appeal by state).
See also State v. Sierp, 260 Ind. 57, 292 N.E.2d 245 (1973); State v. Gilbert, 247 Ind. 544, 219
N.E.2d 892 (1966); State v. Rhinehart, 241 Ind. 129, 170 N.E.2d 236 (1960). An example of the
use of a reserved question is provided in State v. Lee, - Ind.App. - , 328 N.E.2d 745
(1975) (applicability of alibi statutes to admissibility of evidence).
65This problem was raised by instructions requested by defendant and refused in Lawson v.
State, - Ind.App. - , 306 N.E.2d 150 (1974).
66See Wyzanski, A TrialJudge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1299
(1952).
"This alternative was rejected in Lawson v. State, - Ind.App. - , 306 N.E.2d 150,
154 (1974), although precedent supported the rule of strict construction itself; but no other solu-
tion was suggested.
"See Newkirk v. State, 27 Ind. 1, 3 (1866) (dictum).
1977]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
from the recognition of this jury role as a safeguard for the defendant,6 9 the
Indiana Supreme Court has had little to say on this question.
Inherent Advantages of the Jury
The jury has much to offer. The jury is fresh to the whole trial process;
whatever the legal problem, it is new to them. Because of this factor, the jury
is able to use a common-sense approach to ambiguous language, untried
statutes or unsettled precedents, perhaps in contrast to the more rigid or
mechanical approach of the judge. Operating by consensus, the jury brings
community values to bear on the resolution of ambiguities and makes it possi-
ble to adjust fluid statutory language to the individual situation. Because it
makes no report of its findings on the law and the facts in each case, its in-
terpretation is not binding in any subsequent case and will not have to be
distinguished by a future court. This, of course, provides subsequent juries
with greater flexibility in their own interpretation of law and facts.
Trust in the jury is a cornerstone of our judicial system. 70 The jury has
been found to be a basically responsible group which generally reflects the
same values as the judge.71 Furthermore, the jury has historically been left to
deal with some issues which are enormously sensitive and difficult for a trial
court to come to grips with. 72 The jury may be untrained in the subtleties of
the law and the complexities of the legal system, but it has been a very im-
portant instrument in achieving the goals of our justice system. 73 Adopting
the model of the jury in the judge's shoes would utilize the strengths of the
jury in the area where those qualities are most appropriate and most
needed-where the law is not clearly settled.
ROLE OF COUNSEL
If the jury is truly to have a "conscious" role in construing the law74 and
is to look beyond its members' own ideas and experiences, the sources of law
69Pritchard v. State, 248 Ind. 566, 576, 230 N.E.2d 416, 421 (1967). The court did-not
elaborate, but one aspect of this safeguard is that it protects the defendant from an overzealous
prosecutor. Another aspect is that an interpretation of law may be the only defense. See Vogel v.
State, 163 Md. 267, 162 A. 705 (1932). This jury role gives the defendant an opportunity to pre-
sent the defense based on law earlier and thus possibly be acquitted by the jury rather than have
to endure the time, cost and uncertainties of the appeal process.
"See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting).
11H. KALVEN & H. ZnIs-I., TIlE AMFRICAN JURY 495-96, 498 (1966).72A prime example of this is the question of insanity as a defense. See United States v.
Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154-57 (1968). See also Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356, 373-74 (1972).
14The fact that the jury is informed of its prerogative is the main distinguishing feature of
this constitutional arrangement as compared to that of other jurisdictions. See e.g., United States
v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Sax, Conscience and Anarchy: The Prosecution of
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become an important factor. For access to the sources of law the jury must
look to counsel. The Indiana Supreme Court has discussed the role of counsel
and the sources of law, 5 but its recognition of them has been incidental to its
larger concern with the jury and its relationship to the rest of the judicial
structure.
This lack of attention may have obscured the truly vital role of trial
counsel. If it is not the duty of the court to give the jury a choice of legal
propositions, 76 it must then be the task of counsel to inform the jury of differ-
ing interpretations of the law. Counsel is the only viable vehicle for educating
the jury; without counsel in this role the substantive impact of article I, sec-
tion 19 would be reduced to whatever results from the interchange between a
neutral judge and the jury. Further, counsel stimulates the jurors to think
about the law, including the meaning of the words, the legislative intent and
the common law background. Counsel can help to channel the thinking of
the jurors and apprise them of the implications of various possible interpreta-
tions.
Until now, the courts' recognition of counsel's role has involved only a
very general idea of some of the types of issues counsel may argue and the
sources he may use. Some questions have been answered with little explana-
tiofh and others have not been explored at all. A prime example of this un-
satisfactory treatment is Sumpter v. State. 77 With no mention of Lynch v.
State78 or subsequent cases, 19 the Sumpter court held that constitutionality is
not for the jury to decide.8 0 This obviously overrules a portion of Lynch8 and
should have done so expressly and with discussion. While the result may be
appropriate, given the fact that the jury's role has to do with guilt or in-
nocence under the statute as enacted, the supreme court overlooked this op-
portunity to articulate policy reasons for drawing the line between judge and
jury as it does. For example, deciding on constitutionality is a task uniquely
appropriate for the judiciary.8 2 This task requires more sophisticated, perhaps
War Resisters, 57 YALE REv. 481, 490 (1968); Van Dyke, The Jury as a Political Instzturion,
CENTER MAG., March-April, 1970, at 17.
7"See, e.g., Hengstler v. State, 207 Ind. 28, 34-35, 189 N.E. 623, 626 (1934); Bryant v.
State, 205 Ind. 372, 380, 186 N.E. 322, 325 (1933); Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 514 (1857).
76See Dean v. State, 147 Ind. 215, 221, 46 N.E. 528, 530 (1897).
"1261 Ind. 471, 306 N.E.2d 95, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 811 (1974) (constitutionality of a
statute is not a matter for the jury).
789 Ind. 514 (1857) (holding that the jury can judge a constitutional question).
"See Bryant v. State, 205 Ind. 372, 186 N.E. 322 (1933) ( error for judge to remove
counsel's argument, including a question of constitutionality, from the jury's consideration).
'0261 Ind. 471, 480, 306 N.E.2d 95, 102, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 811 (1974).
$'Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 514, 515 (1857). There was oblique treatment of this issue in
Beavers v. State, 236 Ind. 549, 141 N.E.2d 118 (1957). A quotation from 53 AM. JUR. Trial §
279 (1970) used by the court to support a difficult point included the statement: "[B]ut the con-
stitutionality of a statute under which a person is prosecuted is a matter for the court to deter-
mine, and it is the duty of the jury to accept the court's determination thereof." 236 Ind. at 558,
141 ...2d at 12.
"Though in a constitutional case or any other case [the judge] must not surrender his
deliberate judgment and automatically accept the view of others, he can ordinarily
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even technical treatment which is not within jury competence. Nor is it a
logical extension of the rationale or justification for the jury determining the
law. If the court would articulate its reasons, counsel would have clearer
guidelines under which to inform the jury and to aid it in performing its
duty.
Another area which the courts have failed to define is the limits of final
argument of counsel. Control of final argument is in the discretion of the
judge, and error will be found only where there is an abuse of discretion
clearly prejudicial to the rights of the defendant.13 A major question not ad-
dressed by the courts is whether counsel may argue law contrary to specific
points of the judge's instructions. This question lies at the very heart of the
implementation of article I, section 19 as the most vital function of trial
counsel.
The mandate of article I, section 19 and the principles of vigorous ad-
vocacy, which provide the backbone of our judicial system,8 4 demand that
counsel be permitted to argue law contrary to the judge's instructions."5 As
indicated earlier, trial counsel is the only vehicle for informing the jury of
differing interpretations of the law. Without such a provision the impact of
article I, section 19 would be reduced to little more than a linguistic trap
8 6
for judges and an invitation to the jury to independently decide the law on an
ad hoc basis only when it was so moved. As an advocate in the legal system of
Indiana, it should be counsel's duty to perform this function, as well as the
best fulfill his duty in a constitutional case by explicitly stating for the benefit of an
appellate court any doubts he has, without going so far as to enter a decree against a
statute which has commanded the assent of a majority of the legislature, and. general-
ly, of the executive.
Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. R-v. 1281, 1298 (1952).
5
SKallas v. State, 227 Ind. 103, 124-25, 83 N.E.2d 769, 778, cert. denied, 336 U.S. 940
(1949) (allowing prosecutor to give common law history upheld as within judge's discretion);
Adams v. State, 179 Ind. 44, 47, 99 N.E. 483, 484 (1912) (dictum) (recognizing well settled rule
that conduct of argument is within discretion of trial court and only an abuse of discretion war-
rants appellate court interference); Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 514, 515 (1857) (dictum) (court has the
right to regulate argument by reasonable rules and limitations).
84This is recognized by statute in Indiana, IND. CoD- § 35-1-35-1 (1976), and by the IN
DIANA CODE OF PROFE-SSIONAi. RsPoNsIBlrrY Canon 7, Ethical Consideration 7-1 (1971).
"Cases such as Shelby v. State, 258 Ind. 439, 281 N.E.2d 885 (1972), have recognized the
right of both sides to argue forcefully in a criminal case, but the court has stopped short of con-
doning "criticism or improper comment on the form or substance of the instruction. ... Id. at
442, 281 N.E.2d at 887.
"Because the early cases established that the judge's instructions could not bind the jury.
much of the litigation on this provision has revolved around semantics. One series of cases at-
tempted to establish that the jury should weigh the judge's instructions in the same way they
weigh the evidence. See Blaker v. State, 30 Ind. 203, 29 N.E. 1077 (1891); Anderson v. State.
104 Ind. 467, 5 N.E. 711 (1885). The court in Landreth v. State, 201 Ind. 691. 171 N.E. 192
(1930), however, put an end to this approach by pointing out that the criteria for weighing the
evidence were totally inappropriate for dealing with the instructions of the trial court. Other
controversies have involved word choices. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 258 Ind. 594, 602-03, 282
N.E.2d 365, 370 (1972) ("shall" versus "should"); Bridgewater v. State. 153 Ind. 560, 565. 55
N.E. 737, 739 (1899); Dean v. State, 147 Ind. 215, 220, 46 N.E. 528, 530, (1896) ("sole" versus
"exclusive"); Hudelson v. State, 94 Ind. 426, 431 (1883) (use of "must").
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duty of the court to permit it. The Indiana Code of Professional Responsibili-
ty states: "A lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of
the law." 87 Furthermore, Ethical Consideration 7-4 states that an advocate
"may argue any permissible construction of the law."88s Considering the
desirability of the role of the judge as representative of the legal establish-
ment and as its sole voice,89 the judge's role under the suggested model need
not change appreciably from what has been established to date. He would
continue to instruct the jury on the law as seen by the higher courts and
himself, and as suggested by either side where correct and not repetitive of
the court's instructions; on the jury's role under the constitution; and on its
responsibility in that role. 90 It would then be counsel's responsibility to inform
the jury of questions of law which could reasonably be determined in a way
other than the court has instructed. Here, ambiguity, encompassing am-
biguous statutory language, law unsettled by the appellate courts, and ques-
tions of first impression, would be the focus and would guide the judge's exer-
cise of discretion in limiting counsel's conduct. Where there is no ambiguity,
the trial judge could foreclose counsel's presentation of the issue to the jury.
In this manner, clear precedents would bind counsel. However, where there is
a good faith relevant argument for ambiguity, counsel should be permitted to
argue that position to the jury.9 It should also be counsel's task to inform the
jury of the accepted tools of statutory interpretation, for example, the use of
legislative intent and history and the canons of construction. He may then re-
quest that the judge instruct the jury regarding the weight it should give to
the contents of counsel's argument.
92
It may be useful at this point to discuss some specific situations and ques-
tions of law in which this approach might well be applied. One way a ques-
tion of law may arise is through the choice of words the prosecutor uses in the
indictment. That wording may reflect his interpretation of the statute involv-
ed rather than the statutory language. 93 If the court denies a defense motion
"Canon 7. See also Ethical Consideration 7-1; Ethical Consideration 7-2.
"INDIANA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 7-4 (1971).
sCf. Eisenshank v. State, 197 Ind. 463, 150 N.E. 365 (1925); Bridgewater v. State, 153
Ind. 560, 55 N.E. 737 (1899).
"This is in accord with the statute, IND. CODE § 35-1-35-1(5) (1976) (the court must state
to the jury all matters of law necessary for its information). Cf. Sankey v. State, 157 Ind.App.
627, 301 N.E.2d 235 (1973); LaDuron v. State, 157 Ind.App. 189, 299 N.E.2d 227 (1973) (by
implication); Wilkoff v. State, 206 Ind. 142, 185 N.E. 642 (1934).
"Counsel does have a responsibility to request instructions on his version of the law. See
Mireles v. State, 261 Ind. 64, 66-67, 300 N.E.2d 350, 351-52 (1973). Requesting instructions may
also be necessary to preserve an error. See Berry v. State, 153 Ind.App. 387, 394-95, 287 N.E.2d
557, 562 (1972).
"This is consistent with prior law. See Chesterfield v. State, 194 Ind. 282, 297, 141 N.E.
632, 637 (1923). Of course, there are some issues which counsel may raise where it is neither ap-
propriate nor necessary to request instructions. See Coppenhaver v. State, 160 Ind. 540, 551, 67
N.E. 453, 457 (1902) (court was not required to instruct on an issue because it had nothing to do
with the law of the case, but counsel should be allowed reasonable latitude in persuading jury).
93The prosecutor is not required to use the statutory language. See Utley v. State, 258 Ind.
443, 281 N.E.2d 888 (1972); Coleman v. State, 253 Ind. 627, 256 N.E.2d 389 (1970).
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to quash the indictment,9 4 then defense counsel should argue to the jury that
the prosecution's interpretation is arguably different from the statute. One
case which illustrates nicely how this might be accomplished is Utley v.
State.95 In Utley, the issue was the meaning of the word "custody" in the
statute concerning escapes from custody. The prosecutor had used the term
"constructive custody" in his charge. The structure of that court's opinion 96
could provide a model for counsel's argument in a similar situation.
97
The new Indiana Penal Code is rife with opportunities for counsel to
argue interpretation to the jury, although the language is much clearer and
simpler than the old statutes. 9 Some aspects which will give rise to these op-
portunities include significant differences between the old and new statutes
regarding similar offenses; 99 the introduction of the scheme of levels of
culpability; 100 and the introduction of offenses which cannot be found in the
old statutes. 0 1 Not only should counsel be able to argue interpretation to the
jury, he should also be allowed to utilize the case law from other jurisdictions
which have enacted criminal codes based on the Model Penal Code102 and to
9
N)IANA Rt'u.E oF CRIMINAl. PROCEDURE 3 (1973).
11258 Ind. 443, 281 N.E.2d 888 (1972).
96
The discussion structured was as follows: (1) statute, (2) wording of prosecutor's affidavit,
(3) basic principles leading to the issue, i.e., what was the meaning and scope of the application
of the word "custody" as used in the statute, and did the use of "constructive" impermissibly
broaden the intended meaning, (4) inherent ambiguity of "custody" in criminal law, (5)
legislative intent and use of the canon of strict construction and (6) conclusion that the pro-
secutor was not free to broaden statutory meaning by adding "constructive" to "custody". Utley v.
State, 258 Ind. 443, 444-47, 281 N.E.2d 288, 289-90 (1972).
97
See also Coleman v. State, 253 Ind. 627, 256 N.E.2d 389 (1970) (defendant was charged
with statutory rape for allegedly raping an inmate of the Indiana School for Girls). In Coleman
the issue, the meaning of "inmate", arose because the victim had escaped or left the school prior
to the alleged rape, The court (1) examined the considerable difference the word made in the
application of the rape statute, (2) stated the rule of strict construction and focused on "inmate"
solely in the context of the rape statute, (3) recognized the obligation of interpreting the word to
give reasonable effect to the statute, and (4) investigated the legislative intent. As the court said,
if the victim "alleged that the appellant raped her, then it is judicially imperative that the
suspect be charged pursuant to the correct provision of the statute." Id. at 663. The court con-
cluded that the defendant had been charged under the wrong provision and reversed the convic-
tion. If a similar situation arose in a jury trial, according to the suggested model, counsel should
be permitted to argue to the jury in just this way.
"Compare IND. CODE § 35-42-4-1 (1976 Supp.) with IND. CODE § 35-13-4-3 (1976) (rape);
IND. CODE § 35-43-3-1 (1976 Supp.) with IND. CODE § 35-13-4-6 (1976) (robbery); IND. CODE §
35-42-1-1 (1976 Supp.) with IND. COnE § 35-13-4-1 (1976) (murder); and Ixn. CODE § 35-43-2-1
(1976 Supp.) with IND. COnE § 35-13-4-4 (1976) (burglary).
"For example, breaking is not required in the new burglary statute. IND. CODE § 35-43-2-1
(1976 Supp.). In IND. CODE § 35-43-3-1 (1976 Supp.) (robbery), "property" has been substituted
for "article of value" and "by using force or by threatening the use of force" for "by violence or
by putting in fear."
'OIND. CODE § 35-41-2-2 (1976 Supp).
"'See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 (1976 Supp.) (attempt); IND. CODE § 35-42-2-2 (1976
Supp.) (recklessness). Also, certain defenses have now been codified in the Penal Code. See IND.
CoDE § 35-41-3-1 et seq. (1976 Supp.) (defenses relating to culpability). The codification raises
the question of whether the codification is intended to be inclusive.
"'2See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STA'. ANN. §§ 53-A-i et seq. (West 1972); DEt.. CODE tit. 11, 201
et seq. (1975); I.. ANN. S-AT. ch. 38, §§ 1 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1975); N.Y. PENAl. LAW (39
McKinney 1975); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 101 et seq. (Purdon 1973).
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support his arguments with relevant discussions by legal scholars on specific
aspects of the Model Penal Code. 03 The only limitation in this situation
would occur where the legislature had intentionally departed from the Model
Penal Code either in its wording or in its intent.
A third type of situation where counsel would have the opportunity to
argue a legal question to the jury is where a nonstatutory question is involved.
This is most likely to arise in the context of defenses. If a given defense has
been clearly rejected by the supreme court, it is fairly obvious that counsel
should not be permitted to argue the point. However, if the acceptance or re-
jection of the defense has never been squarely addressed or is unclear, then
under article I, section 19 and following the suggested model, the jury should
be permitted to hear counsel's argument in order to make its determination
of the law.
It is a logical and necessary extension of the foregoing discussion that this
function of counsel should not be limited to final argument but should be a
consideration throughout the trial. Counsel should formulate an integrated
approach in his strategy so that from the start of the trial, the juror is aware
that there are two levels of determination for which he will be respon-
sible-the elements of the public offense under the designated statute and
whether the evidence shows that the defendant committed that offense. This
strategy would ideally begin with voir dire. Questions propounded to prospec-
tive jurors should be framed both to inform the juror of the jury's bifurcated
task and to provide a preview of the law involved.10 4 Counsel should also keep
the jury's role in mind when challenging jurors in order to eliminate those
who appear incapable of undertaking this role with sufficient independence
and reason.
Opening argument is the next strategic point in the trial. The prosecu-
tion has traditionally used this opportunity to set forth an outline of its case,
within the judge's control.' 05 The rationale supporting the prosecutor's use of
this technique, that of preparing the jurors' minds for the evidence to be
heard, 06 is equally applicable to the defense's opening argument. It should
include the essence of the defense's position on questions of law so that the
jury will have it in mind throughout the presentation of evidence. The closing
argument will, of course, have the greatest effect on the jury's determination
of the law, but the earlier stages may provide a crucial foundation for a truly
effective final argument.
10SSee, e.g., ALI MODEL. PENAL. CODE, Comments Submitted to Annual Meeting (1960); see
also ALI MODEL PENAL. CODE, (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
'"The voir dire process is in the control of the judge's discretion, Robinson v. State, 260
Ind. 517, 297 N.E.2d 409 (1973), so counsel is not unlimited in his utilization of his opportunity.
However, counsel should be able to justify certain questions by averting to the mandate of article
I, section 19, provided that such questions are carefully phrased.
0 Blume v. State, 244 Ind. 121, 128-29, 189 N.E.2d 568, 572 (1963); Coppenhaver v. State,
160 Ind. 540, 547-48, 67 N.E. 453, 456 (1902).
'Blume v. State, 244 Ind. 121, 128-29, 189 N.E.2d 568, 572 (1963).
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In order that the trial judge's discretion not be exercised in such a way as
to undermine either the role of the jury or the role of counsel, it may be
necessary for the Indiana Supreme Court to promulgate certain rules. One
appropriate rule might be to require counsel to give notice to the judge on
points he intends to argue, particularly if any of them might be contrary to
the judge's instructions. Any intended argument which does not contravene
settled precedent and is made in good faith should be permitted. The line
drawn will, of course, depend on the judge's discretion. As is the present
practice, counsel should be required to tender instructions on any position on
which he thinks the judge is in error or on which the judge is omitting a
necessary element. 0 7 This gives the judge the chance to correct himself if he
finds counsel's version convincing, avoiding unnecessary error. To preserve
counsel's subsequent prerogative to argue the law, the proposed rule should
further include the stipulation that counsel be permitted to argue his position
within the limits discussed above. There is a need for such a rule because the
attorney's prerogative cannot be effectively preserved by an appeal. The
damage is already done if counsel has been deprived of the chance he deserv-
ed during the trial to argue that question to the jury.' 0 8
CONCLUSION
It is important that Indiana courts accept their responsibility for im-
plementing article I, section 19 of the Indiana Constitution by systematically
identifying the issues and developing a coherent, consistent and integrated
approach to be used by trial court and counsel. At present there are only
hazy indications of what will be allowed. This vagueness inevitably has a
chilling effect on counsel, especially on defense counsel, who needs to know
what the bounds of the law are.
Contrary to some doubters' views, encouraging an orderly interaction bet-
ween the jury and counsel on questions of law through the suggested model
will benefit both the defendant and the judicial process. There has been con-
cern in the past that the jury might be confused or misled if confronted with
a choice of law.' 09 This approach misses the point. If there is confusion in the
law, it should be acknowledged in the trial process. To do otherwise is unfair
to the defendant whose guilt or innocence would be determined by the jury
according to a falsely certain standard in the instructions. Recognizing
'O'See Mireles v. State. 261 Ind. 64. 300 N.E.2d 350 (1973); see also Berry v. State. 153
Ind.App. 387, 394-95, 287 N.E.2d 557. 562 (1972). Note that IND. CODE § 35-1-35-1 (1976)
divides the responsibility and burden of providing instructions between the trial court and at-
torneys.
'The need to distinguish between limiting the defense and limiting the prosecution in this
regard is suggested by State v. Overholser, 69 Ind. 144, 144-45 (1879) (the court refused to per-
mit the prosecutor to argue the law and the facts to the jury and directed the jury to acquit
because of the state of the evidence).
'This has been given in the past as a reason why the court is required to give "the law" in
only one way in the instructions. See Wilkoff v. State, 206 Ind. 142, 185 N.E. 642 (1934).
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ambiguity is not inviting acquittal. Credible studies'" have concluded that
the jury generally does not go into trial defendant-prone."' The judge also
has an institutional stature which influences the jury." 2 Further, juries are
unlikely to let someone "walk the streets whose freedom genuinely jeopardizes
the community."'"13 It is the confusing or ambiguous situation in the law that
the jury is equipped to deal with; the jury has been entrusted with that
responsibility in other jurisdictions as well as Indiana."
4
Compared to other jurisdictions where there are no similar provisions
vesting the jury with power to determine the law, the role of counsel can have
another positive effect which has not received much attention. In such other
jurisdictions the jury possesses a prerogative-in-fact to determine the law; in
rendering a general verdict of which there is no record concerning the deci-
sionmaking process and no accountability, the jury can, in the privacy of the
jury room, decide that the law is contrary to the judge's instructions." This
is a highly informal process, and the dynamics change when counsel is per-
mitted to argue law contrary to the judge's instructions. When the jury is in-
formed of its prerogative, the process can be more straightforward and the
legal alternatives can be presented systematically and thoroughly. Through
counsel's conduct of his case, as suggested earlier, he can crystallize the issues
and help to insure that the jury confronts the merit of each side's legal posi-
tion.
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that if article I, section 19 is im-
plemented by the courts in an orderly manner with both initiative and
creativity, the Indiana criminal justice system as a whole and individual par-
ticipants will be the beneficiaries.
CAROLYN WHITE SPENGLER
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